Two questions wearing one trench coat
“Is AI a bubble?” is actually two questions. Question one: are AI company valuations inflated?Quite possibly. The honest bear case is strong: hundreds of billions of dollars in data-centre capital expenditure chasing returns nobody can yet prove, startups valued at extreme revenue multiples, and - the detail worth remembering - OpenAI’s own CEO Sam Altman saying out loud in 2025 that investors as a whole were “overexcited” and parts of the market would burn people. When the people selling the boom warn about the froth, take the froth seriously.
Question two: is AI capability inflated? Here the evidence points the other way, and it isn’t vibes - it’s payroll. Models in 2026 write working production code, pass professional licensing exams, and handle live customer queues. More telling than benchmarks is what employers do with money: entry-level routine postings fell 15% in the US and 29% globally in a year, AI was the #1 named layoff reason in March 2026 (~25% of announced cuts), and Malaysian employers pay AI-capable juniors RM 6,000–9,000/month against RM 3,500–6,500 for traditional profiles - the full dataset is in our State of AI Hiring report. Companies don’t restructure hiring around a capability that doesn’t work. So the precise answer: the financial layer may well be a bubble; the capability layer is a payroll line item. History has a name for exactly this combination.
What the dot-com crash actually teaches
The year 2000 is the perfect controlled experiment, because both sides of today’s argument were right back then too. The bears were right: the NASDAQ fell roughly 78% from peak to trough, pets.com and hundreds of eyeball-valued companies evaporated, and trillions in paper wealth vanished. And the bulls were right: the internet did exactly what its evangelists promised- within a decade of the crash it had rebuilt commerce, media, banking, and communication, and the era’s giants (Amazon down 90%+ in the crash, Google IPO-ing into the rubble in 2004) were built or proven in the wreckage. The bubble was real AND the technology was real. Bubbles kill overvalued companies; they have never once killed a working general-purpose technology.
Now the part that matters for you - what happened to people. Tech employment fell after 2000, then recovered and surpassed its bubble peak within a few years, because crashed stock prices didn’t change the fact that every company still needed websites and software. Sort the individuals and a clean pattern appears: the ones hurt worst held speculative equity or worked at eyeball-stage startups with no real product; the ones who did fine - often better than fine - had genuine engineering skills and simply moved to the survivors, where a decade of demand was waiting. The crash sorted people by whether their value was priced in stock or carried in skill. That sorting rule is the entire practical content of bubble history, and it’s the same rule the spreadsheet era enforced on our parents’ generation - the frame we lay out in AI is the new Excel: the technology’s arrival was never optional; only your preparation was.
